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CASE COMMENTS
Evidence-HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGE-TESTIMONY OF THIRD PARTY
EAVESDROPPER CONCERNING PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION ADMISSIBLE
WHERE PRIVILEGED PARTY KNOWS OR HAS REASON To KNOW OF EAVES-
DROPPER'S PRESENCE.-Proffitt v. State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975).
On the morning of July 10, 1973, Joel Medgebow was stabbed
to death as he and his wife slept. Patricia Medgebow, awakened by
her husband's moans, was struck several times in the face by a man
who then fled through a sliding glass door.'
Charles William Proffitt was subsequently charged with and tried
for the murder of Joel Medgebow. 2 At the trial it was established that
fingerprints found on the door through which the assailant fled did
not match Proffitt's. Mrs. Medgebow was unable to identify Proffitt as
the man who struck her, and her description of the assailant's clothing
was only a close approximation to that worn by Proffitt on the night of
the murder . A droplet and a smear of blood too small to identify
as to type were found on Proffitt's shirt; the murder weapon, smeared
with blood of the same type as that of the victim, yielded no finger-
prints.4 During the trial, Mary Helen Bassett, who rented a room
in Proffitt's mobile home, testified that she was awakened early on
the morning of July 10 and overheard Proffitt telling his wife that
he had stabbed and killed a man in an attempted robbery and that
he had beaten a woman.5 Based on this evidence, Proffitt was convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The case reached the
Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal from the imposition of the
death sentence; the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 7
1. Proffitt v. State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975).
2. Id. at 463.
3. Mrs. Medgebow described the intruder as wearing a white pin-striped shirt and
either grey or brown trousers. However, another witness, who had seen Proffitt an
hour before the homicide, described him as wearing a white shirt with a blue emblem
and grey trousers. Id. Mrs. Proffitt confirmed this description of Proffitt's apparel but
stated that on his return home-at about 5:15 a.m.-he was barefoot. Id.
4. id.
5. Mrs. Bassett admitted that she had not seen Profllitt during this conversation;
she did, however, state that she knew his voice well enough to recognize the speaker
as Proffitt. Id.
Proffitt's attorney objected to the admission of this testimony at trial, and on appeal,
he again raised the issue of admissibility, both as to violation of the husband-wife
privilege and the hearsay rule. The court on appeal found no error in the admission
of Mrs. Bassett's testimony; it first held that there had been no violation of the
marital privilege and that the evidence came within the res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule. Id. at 463-65.
6. Id. at 464.
7. Id. at 467. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(l) provides that the supreme court "[s]hall
hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty .... "
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Mrs. Bassett's testimony concerning the conversation between
Proffitt and his wife was among the most damaging evidence that
the state introduced in its case against Proffitt." Although the Florida
Supreme Court gave considerable attention to Proffitt's assertion that
this communication was protected by the husband-wife privilege, it
decided that Mrs. Bassett's testimony was admissible.9
The husband-wife privilege is not a modern concept; it was en-
forced at common law although it did not exist in the form that we
know it today. 10 Until the 19th century, the husband-wife privilege
was incorporated in the common law rule of incompetency," but in
1853, the privilege to refrain from testifying about confidential com-
munications arising through the intimacy of the marital relationship
was recognized as a separate rule of evidence.'
8. The other evidence that was introduced-the fingerprints, the knife, the shirt,
the other descriptions of Proffitt's clothing-indicated nothing which unequivocally
linked Proffitt to the murder. 315 So. 2d at 463.
9. Id. at 465.
10. 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2333 (McNaughton ed. 1961). For a discussion by the
Florida Supreme Court of the common law development of the privilege consult Ex
parte Beville, 50 So. 685 (Fla. 1909).
11. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2333 (McNaughton ed. 1961). Apparently the
privilege not to testify against one's spouse existed before the rule of disqualification
of husband and wife to testify on one another's behalf. Eventually these two rules
merged into one, once more to be divided in the 1800's. Id. at § 2227.
12. Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 83:
Whereas the Law touching Evidence requires further Amendment: Be it
therefore declared and enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons,
in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, as follows:
I. On the Trial of any Issue joined, or of any Matter or Question, or on any
Inquiry arising in any Suit, Action, or other Proceeding in any Court of Justice,
or before any Person having by Law or by Consent of Parties Authority to hear,
receive, and examine Evidence, the Husbands and Wives of the Parties thereto,
and of the Persons in whose Behalf any such Suit, Action, or other Proceeding
may be brought or instituted, or opposed or defended, shall, except as herein-
after excepted, be competent and compellable to give Evidence, either vivd voce
or by Deposition according to the Practice of the Court, on behalf of either or
any of the Parties to the said Suit, Action, or other Proceeding.
II. Nothing herein shall render any Husband competent or compellable to
give Evidence for or against his Wife, or any Wife competent or compellable to
give Evidence for or against her Husband, in any Criminal Proceeding, or in any
Proceeding instituted in consequence of Adultery.
III. No Husband shall be compellable to disclose any Communication made
to him by his Wife during the Marriage, and no Wife shall be compellable to
disclose any Communication made to her by her Husband during the Marriage.
13. Act of Nov. 6, 1829, Aars OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF
FLORIDA 8-9 (1829). The modern version, FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975) provides: "The common
and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the
exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to
be of force in this state; provided, the said statites and common law be not inconsistent
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In 1823, the common law of England as it existed in 1776 was
adopted by statute in Florida.13 Thus Florida indirectly became heir
to the husband-wife privilege, for in 1776 the husband-wife privilege
was still incorporated in the general rule of spousal incompetency.1 4
In 1892, the Florida Legislature declared both spouses competent to
testify as witnesses for or against each other in both civil and criminal
matters;1 5 at that time, the general rule that every individual has a
duty to testify had already been established.16 But an exception to this
with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the legislature of
this state."
14. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
15. In 1879 the common law was altered by providing that a wife could testify
in civil actions to which her husband was a party and was competent to testify:
AN ACT to Allow Married Women to Testify in all Civil Cases where their
Husbands are Parties and Not Disqualified.
The People of the State of Florida, represented in Senate and Assembly, do
enact as follows: SECTION 1. In the trial of civil actions in this State, married
women shall not be excluded as witnesses in cases wherein their husbands are
parties and allowed to testify.
Fla. Laws 1879, ch. 3124.
But, in Schnabel v. Betts, 1 So. 692 (Fla. 1887), the court held that this statute did
not abrogate the incompetency of a husband to testify in a case in which his wife was
a party. The Florida Legislature responded by amending the 1879 statute to remove
the incompetency of both spouses to testify in civil cases:
AN ACT to Amend Chapter 3124 of the Laws of Florida so as to Authorize
both Husband and Wife to Testify in Civil Actions in which Either may be
Interested.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: SECTION 1. That an act
entitled An Act to Allow Married Women to Testify in all Civil Cases where
their Husbands are Parties and not Disqualified, the same being Chapter 3124
of the Laws of Florida, approved March 7, 1879, be amended so as to read as
follows:
"SEcrION 1. That in the trial of civil actions in this State, neither the husband
nor the wife shall be excluded as witnesses, where either the said husband
or wife is an interested party to the suit pending."
Fla. Laws 1891, ch. 4029.
Shortly thereafter, the provisions of law relating to competency of witnesses to
testify in civil cases was extended to criminal cases as well. See FLA. REV. STAT. § 2863
(1892); Everett v. State, 15 So. 543 (Fla. 1894).
Today spouses are competent to testify in actions against each other. FLA. STAT.
§ 90.04 (1975) provides: "Witnesses; competency of wife or husband.-In the trial of
civil actions in this state, neither the husband nor the wife shall be excluded as
witnesses, where either the said husband or wife is an interested party to the suit
pending."
FLA. STAT. § 914.07 (1975) provides: "Competency of evidence.-Except as otherwise
provided, the law regarding competency of evidence and witnesses in civil cases shall
apply in criminal cases."
16. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975) provides: "90.05 Witnesses; as affected by interest.-
No person, in any court, or before any officer acting judicially, shall be excluded from
testifying as a witness by reason of his interest in the event of the action or proceeding,
or because he is a party thereto .... " The predecessor of this statute was enacted
in 1892. See Fla. Laws 1892, ch. 1094; Fla. Laws 1892, ch. 4029.
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rule for spouses was early recognized because "[t]he law appreciated
the fact that even truth itself might be pursued too keenly, and might
cost too much. The general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation
between [husband and wife] .. .would be too great a price to pay
for the chance of obtaining and establishing the truth in regard to
some matter under legal investigation." 1 7
The abrogation of the disability to testify for or against one's
spouse did not in any way affect the rule against disclosure of confi-
dential marital communications.1 8 The courts of Florida have long
recognized that the confidences of marriage are so inherently private
and invasions thereof so destructive to the solidarity of marriage that
even after divorce or death,19 a spouse cannot be compelled to testify
concerning confidential communications made during the marriage.2 0
Generally the privilege may not be waived by one spouse without the
consent of the other,21 but a voluntary disclosure of the communication
by the spouse to whom its disclosure is directly detrimental serves to
nullify the privilege. 22
In spite of Florida's strong interest in fostering and maintaining
the institution of marriage, its courts have not been liberal in their
extension of this privilege. Florida courts have refused to extend the
privilege to encompass more than written and oral communications;
in cases where the husband-wife privilege was claimed to exclude testi-
mony about a spouse's actions, the courts have found the privilege in-
applicable. 23 Since the privilege itself is a departure from the general
17. People v., Hayes, 35 N.E. 951, 954 (N.Y. App. 1894); see also McGill v.
McGill, 19 Fla. 341, 345-46 (1882).
18. Ex parte Beville, 50 So. 685, 688 (Fla. 1909) ("The change of the common-law
rule by making one spouse a competent witness against the other does not affect the
rule against disclosure of marital communication."); Cox v. State, 192 So. 2d 11 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
19. Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954); Mercer v. State, 24 So. 154, 157 (Fla.
1898); Henderson v. Chaires, 6 So. 164, 166 (Fla. 1889).
20. Id. There is one statutory exception to the husband-wife privilege in Florida's
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, requiring spouses to testify to
matters relevant to support proceedings whether based on confidential communications
or not. FLA. STAT. § 88.261 (1975) provides: "Evidence of husband and wife.-Laws attach-
ing a privilege against the disclosure of communications between husband and wife are
inapplicable to proceedings under this chapter. Husband and wife are competent
witnesses and may be compelled to testify to any relevant matter, including marriage
and parentage."
21. Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954) (one spouse may not disclose com-
munications made by the other without consent).
22. In Savino v. Luciano, 92 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1957) (a case involving attorney-client
privilege), the court stated that "[w]hen a party himself ceases to treat a matter as
confidential, it loses its confidential character." Id. at 819. See Tibado v. Brees, 212 So. 2d
61, 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
23. In Mercer v. State, 24 So. 154 (Fla. 1898), the court stated that "[the privilege]
[Vol. 4
CASE COMMENTS
duty to testify, 24 it is understandable that there has been no widespread
extension of the privilege to prohibit spousal testimony concerning
matters other than those involving confidential communications.
The general rule has been that a third party overhearing an other-
wise privileged conversation between spouses may testify to that con-
versation.2 5  The rule extends not only to the testimony of third
should not be confined to mere statements by one [spouse] to the other, but embraces
all knowledge upon the part of either obtained by reason of the marriage relation,
and which, but for the confidence growing out of it, would not have been known."
Id. at 157. This pronouncement, however, that the privilege attaches to more than
statements, appears to have found limited, if any, application in Florida. In Gates v.
State, 201 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), the court permitted a wife to
testify to acts of violence by her husband, for such testimony was to an event rather than
a communication, and thus the marital privilege was inapplicable. In Ross v. State,
202 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967), it was argued that a wife should not
be permitted to testify about her husband's act of delivering a stolen sweater to her on
the grounds that such an event was analogous to telling her that the sweater was
stolen, and testimony to such a communication would be inadmissible because of the
privilege. The court, noting that this was a case of first impression in Florida, refused
to extend the privilege. The court reasoned that the husband-wife privilege is not so
broad as to exclude evidence of acts by a spouse. See also Porter v. State, 160 So. 2d
104 (Fla. 1963). But see Kerlin v. State, No. 75-1765 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., filed July
23, 1976).
24. See note 16 supra. The United States Supreme Court has stated: "The power
of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other
governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence." Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (footnote omitted). This duty to testify is
recognized "in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor." Id. at 443-44. As early as 1562 the power to compel persons to appear and
testify was apparent:
XII. Provided also, and be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
That if any person or persons, upon whom any process out of any of the courts
of record within this realm or Wales shall be served to testify or depose concerning
any cause or matter depending in any of the same courts, (2) and having tendred
unto him or them, according to his or their countenance or calling, such reason-
able sums of money for his or their costs and charges, as having regard to the
distance of the places is necessary to be allowed in that behalf, (3) do not
appear according to the tenor of the said process, having not a lawful and
reasonable let or impediment to the contrary; (4) that then the party making
default, to lose and forfeit for every such offence ten pounds, and to yield such
further recompence to the party grieved, as by the discretion of the judge of
the court, out of the which the said process, shall be awarded, according to the
loss and hindrance that the party which procured the said process shall sustain, by
reason of the non-appearance of the said witness or witnesses; (5) the said
several sums to be recovered by the party so grieved against the offender or
offenders by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, in any of the Queen's
majesty's courts of record, in which no wager of law, essoin or protection to be
allowed.
Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § XII (1562); see also Proceedings against Mary,
Countess of Shrewsbury, 2 How. St. Tr. 769-70 (1612).
25. "A third person overhearing a confidential communication may testify to it .
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2339 (McNaughton ed. 1961). E.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291
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parties whose presence is known to the spouses, but also to the testi-
mony of eavesdroppers whose presence is unknown to the spouses.26
The Proifit court recognized this rule as it applies to third parties
whose presence is known, 27 but by implication it refused to extend the
rule to eavesdroppers. 28 Although the court maintained that its decision
merely followed long respected precedent, 29 its decision in reality marks
a change in attitude regarding the admissibility of an eavesdropper's
testimony.
The general rule that an eavesdropper is competent to testify con-
cerning communications between spouses has never been explicitly
embraced by the Florida courts, and there is a marked dearth of re-
ported cases on this point. Indeed, in this century only one Florida
case other than Proflitt has dealt with the question of whether the
husband-wife privilege extends to exclude the testimony of an eaves-
dropper. In Horn v. State30 a confidential conversation between a hus-
band and wife was overheard by an eavesdropper on an extension
phone. Although testimony of the eavesdropper concerning that con-
versation was ultimately deemed inadmissible under the Florida wire-
U.S. 7 (1934) (communications by spouses made through use of a stenographer not
privileged); State v. Narten, 407 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Barnhart, 442 P.2d
959 (Wash. 1968); State v. Sidoti, 341 A.2d 670 (N.J. App. 1975).
26. "One who overhears the communication, whether with or without the client's
knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege." 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §
2326 (McNaughton ed. 1961) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added) (references are freely
made between attorney-client and husband-wife privileges since general rules apply to
both in most instances). E.g., State v. Schifsky, 69 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1955); Hunter
v. Hunter, 83 A.2d 401 (Pa. 1951); State v. Barnhart, 442 P.2d 959 (Wash. 1968); State
v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331 (Wash. 1953); Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 146 S.E.
726 (W. Va. 1929).
27. The court, citing Wigmore, stated that "[t]he general rule, and clearly the
weight of authority is to the effect that testimony of a third party who overhears a
confidential communication is admissible." 315 So. 2d at 464.
28. Had the rule extended to eavesdroppers, there would have been no need to
discuss whether Proflitt knew or should have known of Mrs. Bassett's presence. Under
the general rule her testimony would have been admissible regardless of Proffitt's
knowledge of her presence. The court's discussion of Proffitt's knowledge of an eaves-
dropper's presence implies that without such knowledge the communication would re-
main privileged and Mrs. Bassett could not testify concerning it.
29. 315 So. 2d at 464. It is significant that the only authority cited for this
proposition was Mercer v. State, 24 So. 154 (Fla. 1898). Mercer only peripherally pertains
to spoken communications between husband and wife. In Mercer, the court declared
"certain classes of communications to be privileged from the inherent character of the
communication .... ." Id. at 158 (emphasis added). The essence of the holding in
Mercer is that letters between husband and wife are inherently privileged and are thus
inadmissible even when produced from the custody of third parties. Although dictum
indicates that oral communications between husband and wife should be accorded the
same privilege as that extended to letters, Mercer does not specifically apply the
husband-wife privilege to oral communications overheard by eavesdroppers.
30. 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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tap statute,"' the court stated that the testimony of a third person-in
this case an eavesdropper-who overhears a confidential conversation
is generally admissible. 32 Thus, Horn contemplates adherence to the
general rule that an eavesdropper whose presence is unknown to
the privileged parties is competent to testify about otherwise privileged
communications.-3
The supreme court's decision in Proffitt, which came 1 year after
Horn, apparently invalidates both Horn as it relates to privileged
communications and the general rule as to the admissibility of an eaves-
dropper's testimony where overheard privileged communications are
involved. Although the court noted that the general rule and weight
of authority supports a conclusion that the privilege does not extend
to exclude the testimony of a third party who overhears the conversa-
tion, 34 it implied that where the presence of the third party, or eaves-
dropper, is unknown, the testimony would be inadmissible.3 5 This
implication is supported by the court's statement that "it has long
31. Id. at 198-99. Chapter 934 of the Florida Statutes was enacted in 1969. Fla.
Laws 1969, ch. 69-17. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(1) (1975) provides in part: "[A]ny person who:
(a) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication . . . . shall be guilty of a
felony of the third degree .... ." This act also contains specific provisions relating to
the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the act. FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1975)
provides:
Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral communications.-
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof,
if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
FLA. STAT. § 934.09(8) (1975) provides:
The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence
derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in
any trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless each party, not less than 10 days
before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the
court order and accompanying application under which the interception was
authorized or approved. This 10-day period may be waived by the judge if he
finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information
10 days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be
prejudiced by the delay in receiving such information.
32. 298 So. 2d at 196.
33. See note 25 supra. The court in Horn also mentioned the possibility of the
right to privacy being pertinent where eavesdroppers were involved. 298 So. 2d at 199.
An earlier case, Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), although not con-
cerned with the husband-wife privilege, held that eavesdropping by a husband upon
telephone calls by his wife to her lover violated both the Florida wiretap statute and
the constitutional right of privacy.
34. 315 So. 2d at 464.
35. See note 28 supra.
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been held in this State that privilege of non-disclosure between husband
and wife . . . attaches to the conversation or the communication itself,
and protects it from exposure in evidence, wheresoever or in whoso-
ever hands it may be."36 This statement indicates that the communica-
tion itself is privileged and inadmissible regardless of the source.
Yet the court recognized that basic to this concept of privilege is the
notion of confidentiality. 7 It realized that a communication normally
privileged loses its privileged character when not made in confidence.
In its discussion of privilege and confidentiality, the court relied on
Schetter v. Schetter,8 a case involving the attorney-client privilege. In
Schetter, the court noted that fundamental to the attorney-client
privilege is the requirement of the expectation of confidentiality by
the parties.39 The Proffitt court focused on this point and utilized it
as the touchstone of its decision. Contrasting Proflitt with Schetter,
the court stated that "it is clear that [in Proffitt] there was no attempt
to make the communication in confidence .... Therefore the privilege
character of the communication was lost ... "40 Thus, although the
privilege may actually attach to the conversation itself, it may be for-
feited by the parties who make the communication if they do not
insure that they are not overheard.
In Profitt the defendant's conversation with his wife lay outside
the protective cover of the husband-wife privilege, for the court found
that he and his wife knew or should have known that their privileged
communication was being overheard. 41 Yet Proffitt implies that the
husband-wife privilege may be extended to exclude the testimony of
all eavesdroppers who overhear confidential interspousal communica-
tions. To determine when an eavesdropper's testimony will be excluded,
the court focused upon what constitutes a "confidential" conversation
and made clear that it was not simply a private conversation between
the parties. The court placed a heavy burden of proof upon the
shoulders of the one claiming the privilege to prove that the con-
versation was indeed confidential. 42 Apparently Proffitt demands that
36. 315 So. 2d at 464.
37. Id. at 464-65.
38. 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970). In Schetter an attorney secretly
taped a telephone conversation with his client and gave it to a psychiatrist who testified
on the issue of the client's mental competency. This was deemed inadmissible because
it was violative of the attorney-client privilege.
39. 239 So. 2d at 52.
40. 315 So. 2d at 465.
41. Id.
42. Id. "[I]t is clear that there was no attempt to make the communication
in confidence. . . .There is absolutely no testimony indicating that either [Proffitt] or
his wife made any attempt . . . to keep the conversation from being overheard." Id.
[Vol. 4
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a party claiming privilege prove that he and his spouse did not speak
in such a manner and place that there was a reasonable chance of being
overheard, and that they did not know of any possibility of being
overheard at that time.43 Proffitt, however, indicates that if this
burden is met, then further protection will be afforded the marital
relationship by excluding from testimony interspousal communica-
tions which previously had been admissible. As a general rule the testi-
mony of the eavesdropper is no longer admissible in Florida; the ad-
missibility of such testimony now hinges on the protected spouses'
knowledge or reason to now of the eavesdropper's presence.
ELAINE KAY FREEMYER
Admiralty-SALVAGE-THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ASSERTED
SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE OVER ABANDONED PROPERTY ON OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF.-Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing
Vessel Believed To Be the Nuestra Sehora De Atocha, 408 F. Supp. 907
(S.D. Fla. 1976).
In July of 1975, after years of frustrating and expensive work,
Treasure Salvors, Incorporated, and Armada Research Corporation
succeeded in bringing to the surface of the ocean two bronze cannon
from a sunken ship. The wreck was located approximately 45 miles
west of Key West, Florida, on the continental shelf, but outside of the
territorial waters1 of the United States (on the so-called "outer shelf").
The wreck was thought to be that of the Nuestra Sehora de Atocha,
a Spanish galleon which sank with tons of silver in 1622.2
The two corporations brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida for possession and
confirmation of title of the wreck. The plaintiffs claimed that general
43. Id.
1. The United States places a 3-mile limit on its territorial waters. For a discussion
of efforts to settle upon an internationally known limit on territorial waters and reasons
for the United States preference for the 3-mile limit, see Dean, The Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L. L. 607, 610-13 (1958).
2. The Miami Herald, Feb. 5, 1976, § B, at 2, col. 5 (street ed.). While the silver
treasure allegedly carried by the Atocha has not been found, nine bronze cannon
have been raised by plaintiffs, some valued at $40,000 each. Id.
19761
